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The multiple lockup expiration of government shares 
--- Evidence from the Share Split Structure Reform in China 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the market performance around the lockup expiries of Chinese government shares since 
the secondary privatisation in 2005. Due to the unique feature of this privatisation, the picture is complicated with 
multiple lockup expiries specified in the agreements for the vast majority of the sample firms and which varied 
from firm to firm. This issue has never been addressed in previous literature. Additionally, global research on this 
topic is under-investigated. We propose that the market reactions should be examined with a deep understanding 
of the specific event itself, such as the lockup expiry dates written in the original agreements relative to the actual 
lockup expiry dates. By doing so the explanations put forward are based on a customised investigation of the firms 
and therefore are more likely to be plausible and convincing. We then develop our own hypotheses surrounding 
the implicit bargaining power of minority shareholders, which fit into the specific context in China. To test the 
hypotheses, we categorise “normal” and “abnormal” lockup expiries, with the “normal” expiries conforming to 
the dates written in the original proposals and the “abnormal” expiries deviating from the proposed dates. We 
estimate the cumulative excess returns (CER) with different event windows. We find that in general, the short-
run CERs and long-run CER results are higher for firms with “normal” expiries than those with “abnormal” 
expiries, suggesting that any deviation from specified lockup expiry dates may be a signal of both the implicit 
bargaining power of minority shareholders and subsequent performance.   
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1 Introduction  
Share lockups usually refer to agreements signed by insiders in a firm to restrict them from selling their shares for 
a pre-specified period of time after an IPO or SEO. The main body of literature investigates the underlying 
motivation for the specification of share lockups. A widely-held view is that share lockups prohibit immediate 
informative selling by insiders until their informational advantage over outsiders (public investors) fades away 
completely at the lockup expiration (Karpoff et al. 2013). As a result, any insider trading following expiration is 
not informative selling and market reactions around lockup expiries should be normal. However, empirical 
research reports significant negative excess returns around lockup expiries in both developed and developing 
countries (Field and Hanka 2001; Liao et al. 2011; Chong and Liu 2016), which contradicts the theory. The reasons 
underlying the negative excess returns are mostly hypothesised to be a result of perceived market imperfections. 
However, these reasons are weakly supported by the empirical evidence (Field and Hanka 2001; Cao et al. 2004; 
Zheng et al. 2005).  
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) suggests that abnormal stock returns are associated with unexpected 
information around the time of lockup expiries, but cannot help explain which message would be perceived by 
investors. Therefore more recently a few studies have introduced the information signalling hypothesis (ISH) 
which further develops the EMH by relating the abnormal stock returns to the signals emitted from unexpected 
information around the time of lockup expiries. It is suggested that pre-known characteristics of the firms, such 
as transparency, performance, governance and ownership structure (Field and Hanka 2001; Hakim et al. 2012; 
Liao et al. 2011), and of the lockup decisions, such as the length of lockup period (Hakim et al. 2012), permanently 
signal the quality of firms and thus influence the abnormal stock returns around the time of lockup expiration. 
These studies presume that the pre-known firm characteristics and lockup features persistently send out signals 
over time and therefore influence the market reactions around the later lockup expiries.  However, we argue that 
this pre-known information delivers a constant signal over time, while investors will interpret corporate actions 
on the lockup expiration days (new signals) rather than pre-known corporate characteristics and decisions. This 
perspective is under-investigated in the literature and it motivates us to conduct research to examine the signalling 
theory. In this paper we investigate stock returns around the lockup expiries after the Chinese secondary 
privatisation in 2005, also called the split share structure reform (SSSR), the unique features of which provide 
fruitful avenues for us to explore the appropriateness of our proposed explanation. Briefly, in order to pave the 
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way for the secondary privatisation, government agencies who held shares in listed State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
firms made commitments in written agreements to lock up their shares for a certain period of time (at least 12 
months) after the date of privatisation. In China, each listed SOE firm had several government agencies as 
stakeholders, and therefore it was possible for a firm to have multiple lockup expiry dates agreed between these 
agencies and the minority shareholders, with these dates specified in the reform proposals. This enables us to 
observe the market reactions over a series of lockup expiries. Also to the best of our knowledge, Liao et al. (2011) 
is the only study which investigates market reactions around the lockup expiration after the SSSR. However, their 
results must be interpreted with caution, since their incomplete data, from June 2006 to April 2007, may lead to 
biased results, since for many firms, a proportion of shares were still locked up two years after the SSSR. Second, 
they didn’t consider multiple lockup expiration dates, which are dominant amongst the participating firms, over 
80% of firms had more than one lockup expiry and around 65% of firms had three or more different lockup 
expiries. 
Focussing on the start of the expiry of the lock up process we argue that a “normal” or an “abnormal” expiry 
signals the implicit bargaining power (IBP) of minority shareholders. Our view is that Chinese minority 
shareholders are not as weak as has been assumed by some scholars (for example, Firth et al. 2010). On the 
contrary minority shareholders consistently represent a “default” threat to the government like “the Sword of 
Damocles” because they have the choice to exit the market if they wish, the consequences of which the 
government cannot afford. We categorise the “default threat” as the IBP of minority shareholders. For example, 
the Chinese government had witnessed a depressed stock market for four years from 2001 to 2004 after the first 
failed reform process, until they invited minority shareholders to the negotiating table and finally decided to 
compensate them in 2005, which is a milestone in the SSSR (Zeng and McLaren 2015). Consistent with the 
information signalling theory, we propose that a “normal” lockup expiration indicates that minority shareholders 
have strong IBP which ensured that the government shares were unlocked precisely as planned in the agreement 
while an “abnormal” expiration indicates the opposite.  
We calculate the CER (-1, +1) for both “normal” and “abnormal” groups and also run the statistical tests. The 
results support our hypothesis that “normal” expiries signal strong IBP of minority shareholders, but rejects our 
hypothesis that “abnormal” expiries signal weak IBP. It might be because the signal doesn’t remain constant over 
time. Investors may readjust their perceptions if the surrounding environment which would frame investors’ 
expectations changes. We then consider the first expiry (i.e. within each firm, the date when the first agency is 
cleared to trade up to 5% of the total number of shares) and compare it to the last expiry (within each firm, the 
date when the final agency is cleared to trade up to 5% of the total number of shares). Investors may be surprised 
by the “abnormality” at the first “abnormal” expiration but would feel relief at the last “abnormal” expiration 
because the last one puts an end to the “abnormality” which indicates a resolution to the conflicts between the 
stakeholders. We then check the market reactions around the first and the last “normal” and “abnormal” expiries 
and find more favourable CERs at the “normal” expiries than the “abnormal” expiries, which supports our 
hypothesis.   
We obtained our data from WIND, a leading Chinese database used by the majority of universities and financial 
institutions in China. Subject to data availability, our final sample includes 1066 firms and there are a total of 
3161 lockup expiry dates after the SSSR, in the period from 2006 to 2015. There are 1726 expiry dates which are 
consistent with the written lockup arrangements in the pre-set agreements and thus categorised as “normal” 
expiries, as well as 1435 expiry dates which are delayed and which deviated from the original agreements and 
thus they are categorised as “abnormal” expiries. These “abnormalities” were caused by various conflicts or 
disputes between the stakeholders.   
In general, this study follows the literature to examine the information signalling theory but focuses on new signals 
perceived by investors around the announcement day of lock-up expirations rather than constant signals from the 
“pre-known” information. Second we are the first to propose that Chinese minority shareholders, though 
seemingly weak, may have strong but implicit bargaining powers against government counterparties. And our 
results show that the Chinese stock markets are capable to receive the implicit signals and respond correspondingly. 
The lockup expirations after the Chinese secondary privatisation are under-investigated in the literature. .    
The rest of paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to Chinese secondary privatisation. 
Section 3 reviews and discusses the relevant literature and then proposes our research hypotheses. Section 4 
explains the source of data and the selection process of our final sample with some descriptive statistics, as well 
as justification for the design of our research methods, including an event study design and panel-data pooled 
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regression design. Section 5 presents the key results with critical analysis and discussions. Section 6 concludes 
the paper.  
2 Chinese secondary privatisation  
In 2005, there was a potential for global repercussions when the Chinese government launched the split share 
structure reform (SSSR), also called the secondary privatisation program, to sell its shares in listed SOE firms, 
around two-thirds of the total number of listed shares on the market at that time. The magnitude of the sale meant 
that the process had to be carefully planned and executed. This was particularly the case since an earlier attempt 
to sell the shares in 2001 had failed. Specific features of the design included compensation payments to the 
minority public shareholders (who had only one third of the total shares), as well as a structured, gradual process 
and the “lockup period” for a minimum of one year immediately after the final reform agreement was announced, 
where no government shares could be traded, to maintain liquidity and to ensure that blocks of shares would not 
be dumped on the market (Hou and Lee 2014; Zeng and McLaren 2015). After the 12-month lockup expiry and 
conditional upon full payment of the agreed compensation, government shares representing no more than 5% of 
the total shares outstanding could be traded in the first year, and no more than 10% during the following year, 
until the third year after lockup expiry, restrictions were removed completely. Under this general guidance set by 
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), at the firm-level, government shareholders and the minority 
shareholders were allowed to negotiate with each other on the essential details of the compensation paid to 
minority shareholders, instead of following a rigid one-fits-all plan. The final plan would only be authorised by 
the CSRC when approved by at least two thirds of the minority shareholders in a firm. As a result of the firm-
level negotiations, different firms came up with different amounts of compensation paid in various forms1, and 
different lengths of lockup period in excess of or equal to the minimum 12-months required by the CSRC. 
Within this process, it is clear that the first lockup expiry has the potential to provide new information, since this 
expiry signals that compensation has been paid and trade in government shares can take place (subject to the 5% 
trading restrictions). After this first expiry, other dates followed automatically (i.e. the 10% trading restrictions 
and then finally, expiry of all trading restrictions). However, an interesting observation is that many firms had 
more than one set of lockup expiry dates that were specified for their different types of government shareholders. 
In China, the government’s shares were held by various agencies, for example state asset management bureaus, 
SOEs affiliated to the central government, and SOEs affiliated to the local government etc., and each of these had 
different motivations and incentive structures (Chen et al. 2009). The discrepancy amongst the government 
agencies further complicated the negotiation process. Within each individual firm, various agencies in many cases 
made commitments to lockup their shares for various lengths of time which resulted in multiple lockup expiry 
dates being written into the original reform agreements for any one firm.  
Figure 1 graphs the timeline of the CSRC requirements and multiple lockup expiries at the firm-level.  
                                                          
1 Compensation took various forms, either in shares, in cash, in pre-assigned rights, or a combination of more 
than one type. Compensation size also varied across firms (Zeng and McLaren, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Timeline (years) of the CSRC minimum requirements and the firm-level multiple lockups  
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3 Literature and Hypotheses Development 
The CSRC carefully monitored firms as they approached the first pre-agreed lockup expiry date for each of their 
agencies, granting permission to those government shareholders who had fulfilled their compensation 
commitments by the time of the scheduled lock up expiry to unlock their shares (and thus be permitted to trade 
up to 5% of the total) or holding back those groups who didn’t pay on time. Late payment could be due to a 
number of reasons2. For example, a certain government agency may have had difficulty meeting the financial 
obligations of the compensation. In other cases, late compensation could be due to an unwillingness to pay as a 
result of ongoing unresolved monetary disputes between government agencies in the same firm, with one agency 
not wanting to pay until the disputes had been settled. Late compensation could also be due to unresolved 
complaints from the minority shareholders against some of the government agencies who the shareholders 
believed had previously expropriated their interests, meaning that the minority shareholders were reluctant to 
accept the compensation payment, believing that it would signal that the previous disputes were resolved. 
Whatever the reason for non-payment at the agreed date, the CSRC would maintain the full lockup of the shares 
until the agency had satisfactorily fulfilled its responsibilities. As a result, there are first lockup expiry dates which 
are consistent with the agreement and executed precisely as planned, which we categorise as “normal” expiries, 
and for other agencies, first lockup expiry dates which “deviated” from the agreement due to some government 
agencies extending their lockup periods, which we categorise as “abnormal” expiries.  
The EMH assumes that investors respond only to new information which comes to the markets in a random way. 
If the theory holds, investors would respond calmly around the “normal” lockup expiration dates because they 
knew exactly what would happen, like when the firms would announce lockup expiries and how much shares 
would be unlocked since all these had been written in the agreements. On the contrary, investors would be 
surprised around the “abnormal” lockup expiration dates because the information disclosed was different to what 
investors had expected.  
Generally, the EMH, when considered in isolation, focuses on the information which delivers a clear message to 
investors. For example, studies of earnings announcements clearly show that investors react positively to 
unexpected good results and negatively to unexpected poor results (Brown et al. 1987; Rendleman et al. 1987). In 
many other cases, EMH may be considered in combination with other theories. For example, many studies 
investigate the market reactions around seasoned equity offerings to test the ISH which suggest that equity issues 
provide a negative signal, based on the argument that managers have superior information compared to investors 
                                                          
2 Not every company would provide a reason. Those who provided reasons would include them in the proposals 
released on the announcement days of the lock-up expiries. We’ve summarised the mainly mentioned reasons in 
the proposals here and assumed that these reasons covered most of the cases.  
Successful 
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(Scholes 1972; Jensen-Mecking 1976; Ross 1976; Mikkelson and Partch 1985; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Barclay 
and Litzenberger 1988; Errunza and Miller 2003 etc.).  
A joint information signalling theory assumes that investors could subjectively perceive and interpret the 
corporate actions as different (unexpected) “signals” and react accordingly. In our context, the theory suggests 
that investors may take initiatives to “read between the lines” at the expiry dates and thus conjecture some 
implications. Previous studies presume that corporate characteristics, such as transparency and governance, 
instead of corporate actions, are perceived by the investors as signals of firm quality at the time of lockup expiry 
(for example, Liao et al. 2011). We argue that investors are more motivated to interpret corporate actions on the 
announcement days rather than pre-known corporate characteristics.3 In our argument, corporate actions send out 
instant and timely signals on the lockup expiration days while corporate characteristics deliver the same (pre-
known and indirect signals) on a continuous basis. Investors would view a “normal” lockup expiration as a precise 
execution of the agreement and an “abnormal” lockup expiration as a “deviated” execution, where a “precise” or 
a “deviated” execution indicates how powerful the minority investors of a firm are when they bargain for what 
they want from the government shareholders, in this case to execute the agreement to their expectations.  
According to Firth et al. (2010) and Liu et al. (2014), the bargaining powers of large minority shareholders, the 
mutual funds in China, were explicitly weak and marginalised under the pressure from the government during the 
SSSR negotiation. However, the minority shareholders successfully coerced the government to negotiate and to 
reach agreements regarding compensation. This fact itself demonstrates that the minority shareholders are not as 
weak as previously thought. The government learnt this lesson after its first attempt in 2001 to sell government 
shares when the minority shareholders in response withdrew from the markets. Consequently the stock market 
slumped by around 40% and the damage lasted for four years until the government initiated the SSSR negotiation 
process (Khurshed et al. 2015; Zeng and McLaren 2015). Therefore, although the minority shareholders may 
compromise to some extent on some specific compensation terms during the SSSR negotiation, they consistently 
represent a “default threat” to the government We categorise the “default threat” as the “implicit bargaining power 
(IBP)” of minority shareholders and distinguish it from the “explicit bargaining power (EBP)” during the 
negotiation as discussed by Firth et al. (2010), Li et al. (2011) and Cumming and Hou (2014).  
A few studies propose that the IBPs of the involved parties in a bilateral relationship will eventually end up with 
equilibrium in the name of “implicit contracts”, voluntary and self-enforcing long-term agreements made between 
two parties, such as supplier-customer relationships (Helper et al. 1995; Nakaruma et al. 2011), 
employee/executive-firm relationships (Gillian et al. 2009), and stakeholder-corporation relationships (Gerwin et 
al. 2008). In other words, the two sides of an “implicit contract” test the boundaries of each other and after a few 
trials they understand the relative boundaries as well as the potential consequence if these boundaries are breached 
(the default threat). With this mutual understanding, the two parties can finally reach an equilibrium stage at which 
they volunteer to show a certain respect for each other and perform within each other’s boundaries. This is 
different from the “written contract” which specifies the details of “dos and don’ts” with regards to a particular 
case. The mutual understanding in the “implicit contract” builds the foundation for a “written contract” to take 
effect. In our context, the “implicit contract” between the minority shareholders and government shareholders 
after the secondary privatisation influences how the government shareholders execute the “written agreement” at 
the lockup expiration day. The minority shareholders who have stronger IBPs in the “implicit contract” would 
pose a bigger “default threat” to the government shareholders who would then feel a higher urgency to execute 
the agreement precisely as planned, and vice versa.  
Therefore we argue that the “normal” expiry dates send out a signal that the minority shareholders have strong 
IBPs against the government counterparty while the “abnormal” expiration dates deliver the opposite signal. As 
a result, the investors would respond favourably to “normal” lockup expiry days but negatively to the “abnormal” 
lockup expiry days.  
Before we make any hypotheses, we understand there are multiple lockup expiry dates at the firm level and it is 
essential for us to differentiate the first and the subsequent lockup expiry dates. In the prior literature investigating 
a series of announcements relevant to the same corporate actions, there is evidence that the first announcement is 
supposed to informationally dominate the subsequent announcements unless the subsequent announcements carry 
                                                          
3 In our argument, corporate actions are instant and timely although we recognise that these actions may be 
affected by the corporate characteristics to some extent.   
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additional information (Lee 1997; Ramnath 2002; Huang et al. 2016). Therefore we expect the first lockup expiry 
is more informative concerning the “IBP” of monitory investors than the subsequent lockup expiries. We assume 
that the first “normal” lockup expiry would please the market with a strong IBP signal while the first “abnormal” 
expiry would surprise the market with the deviation from the initial agreement and therefore arouse investors’ 
initial concerns about the minority investors’ IBPs. We then propose Hypothesis 1 as follows: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): “Normal” expiries indicate that minority investors have stronger IBP than investors in firms 
with “abnormal” expiries. Therefore stock prices will react more positively to FIRST “normal” lockup expiries 
than FIRST “abnormal” lockup expiries.  
Next we will check whether there is any additional information implied in the subsequent first lockup expiries 
relating to further government agencies within a firm. In other words, we are interested to investigate whether the 
signal of “IBP” remains constant across all expiries or whether there are any information changes which would 
incentivise the investors to readjust their perceptions and interpretation over time and then influence their reactions 
accordingly.  
An important issue worthy of attention in this case is that the number of subsequent lockup expiry dates varies 
from company to company. For instance, some companies may have zero or one subsequent first lockup expiry, 
while some others may have two, or three or even more than ten subsequent first lockup expiry dates, depending 
on the number of government agencies involved (see Table 1 below). If we pool all subsequent lockup expiry 
dates, those companies with more subsequent lockup expiries may be over-weighted and thus lead to biased results. 
In order to equally weight each company involved, we only focus on the first lockup expiry date for the final 
agency within each firm.. 
Each of the final of the first lockup expiry dates, “normal” or “abnormal”, indicates a full lift of the illiquidity on 
state-owned shares, which is additional information. Therefore we assume the last lockup expiries, irrespective of 
“normal” or “abnormal”, signal a full relief for the policy makers as well as an end to uncertainty for investors. 
And we make our hypothesis 2 accordingly:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Stock prices will react more positively to the LAST lockup expiries than to the FIRST lockup 
expiries, regardless of whether they are “normal” or “abnormal” lockup expiries. 
Regarding the signal of IBP, the subsequent lockup expiry dates, if consistent with the “normal” or “abnormal” 
category of the first lockup expiry, don’t provide any additional information about the “IBP” of minority investors. 
And those subsequent lockup expiries that are contrary to the corresponding “normal” or “abnormal” first lockup 
expiries provide contrary information and should influence the market accordingly.  
A change from “normal” first lockup expiry to “abnormal” last (of the first) expiry indicates the IBP of minority 
investors weakens and a change from “abnormal” to “normal” indicates the IBP of minority investors improves. 
The market would respond more favourably to an “abnormal to normal” change than a “normal to abnormal” 
change. We then construct our hypothesis 3 below: 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The stock prices will react more positively to an “abnormal to normal” change than to a 
“normal to abnormal” change.  
The literature suggests that ownership type affects market reactions around lockup expiries (Field and Hanka 2001; 
Hakim et al. 2012). According to Cornett et al. (2007), banks and insurance companies are labelled “pressure 
sensitive” investors as they are more likely to have potential business relations with firms and less willing to 
challenge management decisions. Firth et al. (2010) pointed out that mutual fund firms in China are mostly 
indirectly or directly controlled by the Government-owned banks, securities companies, and also regulated and 
supervised by the CSRC which also decides the appointment and removal of senior fund managers. As evidence, 
they found that mutual funds had weak bargaining power which, under pressure from the government, was 
compromised during the negotiation process. We then propose that the mutual funds are pressure-sensitive and 
their ownership impairs the IBP of minority shareholders in general.  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): mutual fund ownership negatively affects the market reaction around every lockup expiration 
date. 
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4 Data and Methodology 
Our paper includes all the lockup expiries of as many as participating firms as possible, subject to the availability 
on WIND. Our full data covers from 2006 until 2015 and consists of 1161 firms and 3863 observations of lockup 
expiries, due to the existence of multiple lockup expires in the majority of firms. According to Table 1, 86.82% 
of the firms have more than one lockup expiry and 64.69% have at least three lockup expiries. Given the 
overwhelming scale, the phenomenon of multiple lockup expiries should be taken seriously and examined 
carefully.  
Table 1: Multiple lockup expiries 
Number of 
Different 
Lockup 
expiries 
dates 
Number of 
observatio
ns 
Number of 
firms 
% of the 
total 
Cumulative 
% 
Cumulative %  
At least N lockup expiries 
1 153 153 13.18% 13.18% At least 1 100% 
2 412 206 17.74% 30.92% At least 2 86.82% 
3 1176 392 33.76% 64.69% At least 3 69.08% 
4 620 155 13.35% 78.04% At least 4 35.31% 
5 800 160 13.78% 91.82% At least 5 21.96% 
6 228 38 3.27% 95.09% At least 6 8.18% 
7 175 25 2.15% 97.24% At least 7 4.91% 
8 128 16 1.38% 98.62% At least 8 2.76% 
9 45 5 0.43% 99.05% At least 9 1.38% 
10 30 3 0.26% 99.31% At least 10 0.95% 
11 44 4 0.34% 99.66% At least 11 0.69% 
12 12 1 0.09% 99.74% At least 12 0.34% 
13 26 2 0.17% 99.91% At least 13 0.26% 
14 14 1 0.09% 100.00% At least 14 0.09% 
Total 3863 1161 100%   
 
4.1 Overall sample  
According to Figure 2, the distribution of the number of lockup expiries is positively skewed, indicating that there 
are some extreme cases which may lead to biased results if included. Our objective is to investigate the situation 
and draw some general conclusions. We therefore omit those firms which have six or more lockup expiries (8.18% 
of the total) so as to have a more normally distributed histogram as the bell-shaped curve indicates in the figure 
below. Our final sample contains 1066 firms (91.82% of the total) and 3161 observations, including firms which 
have five or fewer lockup expiry paths. 
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Figure 2 Histogram of Lockup Expiries 
 
In order to classify “normal” and “abnormal” expiries, we check each sample firm’s actual (first) lockup expiry 
dates for each government agency against the stated lockup expiry dates in their agreements and define those 
expiry dates which are consistent with the agreement as “normal” expiries, and those which deviated from the 
agreement as “abnormal” expiries. As a result, we have two categories, “normal” expiries and “abnormal” expiries. 
Table 2: First and Last “Normal” Lockup Expiries and “Abnormal” Lockup Expiries 
Sequence of Lockup 
expiries Number of Observations 
% of the total 
Normal 
expiries 
Abnormal 
expiries 
Total 
Normal 
expiries 
Abnormal 
expiries 
Full Sample 1726 1435 3161 54.60% 45.40% 
First agency expiry 770 296 1066 72.23% 27.77% 
Last agency expiry 441 472 913 48.3% 51.7% 
Total 1211 768 1979 61.19% 38.81% 
Characteristics of last lockup expiries 
Types Number of observations Percentage 
Consistent with First 578 63.31% 
Inconsistent with First 335 36.69% 
 Normal to Abnormal 288 85.97% 
 Abnormal to Normal  47 14.03% 
 
Table 2 shows that there are 1726 “normal” expiries (54.60%) and 1435 “abnormal” expiries (45.40%). 72.23% 
of the first lockup expiries are “normal” and 27.77% are “abnormal”. But the picture is more balanced when we 
come to the last lockup expiries, with 48.3% “normal” and 51.7% “abnormal”. In other words, if a firm has a 
series of lockup expiries, the “normal” expiries tended to occur at an earlier stage than the “abnormal” expiries. 
There are 1066 observations for the first lockup expiry but only 913 observations for last lockup expiry since 153 
firms have only one lockup expiry. The resulting sample consisting of both first and last expiries has a total of 
1979 observations.  
Furthermore, 63.31% of the last lockup expiries carry the same information as the first lockup expiries (normal-
normal or abnormal-abnormal) and therefore supposedly offer no-surprise to the market. The remainder, 36.69%, 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
fi
rm
s 
Count of lockup expiries
Outliers
9 
 
of the last lockup expiries (335 observations) carry the opposite information (normal-abnormal or abnormal-
normal) and are expected to stir the market in the opposite way from the first lockup expiries.  
4.2 Event study 
The classic method of the event study is applied in this paper to examine market reactions on lockup expiry days. 
Although there is no unique structure for an event study, we follow Binder (1998) and Campbell et al. (1993) to 
design an event-study so as to meet our research objectives. 
4.2.1 Estimating excess returns 
First we follow most empirical literature to use the event-study to apply the OLS market model to estimate excess 
returns (Mikkelson and Partch 1985, 1986; Loderer et al. 1991; Errunza and Miller 2003 etc.). In the theoretical 
literature, the OLS market model is also recommended for providing more precise inferences than other models 
(Campbell et al. 1993) and relying less on strong assumptions like jointly multivariate normal, independently and 
identically distributed variables through time, and cross-sectionally independent variables across securities 
(Brown and Warner 1980, 1985; Mikkleson and Partch 1988; Boehmer et al. 1991; Corrado 1989; Corrado and 
Zivney 1992).   
There are some alternative models which are not the most appropriate for this study. First, the simplest mean-
adjusted model may produce downward biased results in the presence of cross-sectional dependence (CSD) 
(Chandra et al. 1990). Studies also find that even relatively moderate CSD could cause Type I errors (Salinger 
1992; Aktas et al. 2007; Kothari and Warner 2007; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). CSD amongst Chinese listed 
firms is a big concern (Zeng and McLaren 2015), which justifies our decision to rule out the use of the simple 
mean-adjusted model. Second the use of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was common in event studies of 
the 1970s. However, the CAPM results may be sensitive to the restrictions imposed by the CAPM on the market 
model, which are questionable and may not be valid (Fama and French 1996). The risk can be avoided at little 
cost by using the OLS market model and therefore the use of the CAPM has almost ceased (MacKinlay 1997). 
In general, the OLS market model estimator of the excess return is relatively unbiased (Binder 1998) and is applied 
here: 
mtiiitit RR   , where i  and i  were the OLS values (parameters) from the estimation period of security 
i , 
itR  is the return of security i  at time t , mtR  is the corresponding market return at time t  and it  is the zero 
mean disturbance term (excess return). 
It has been suggested that a broad-based stock index should be used for the market portfolio (Fama et al. 1969, 
Binder 1998). The sample companies are listed either on the Shanghai stock exchange (SHSE) or on the Shenzhen 
stock exchange (SZSE). Therefore we follow Zeng and McLaren (2015) to use SHSE A-Share Index and SZSE 
A-Share Index for firms listed in SHSE and SZSE respectively. 
4.2.2 Aggregation of excess returns  
The abnormal return observations are aggregated in order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest. The 
aggregation is along two dimensions, through time and across securities. 
In line with Zeng and McLaren (2015), we define a three-day event window (-1, +1), covering the previous day, 
the announcement day (lockup expiry date) and the following day. The cumulative excess return (CER) is 
introduced to accommodate multiple sampling intervals within the event window (Campbell et al. 1993). CER (-
1, +1) provides a short-run picture of the market reactions around our event of interest. We further calculate the 
long-run CERs which cover the whole year (31, 255) after the expiries for comparison.  
We define 
21 tt
CER   as the cumulative excess return for security i  from 1t  to 2t  where 21 tt  , then 

2
1
21 )(
t
t
itttiCER  . Then the individual securities’ CERs can be aggregated across securities as: 
  
N
ttitt CER
N
CER
1
)()( 2121
1
where 
t is the sample average of the N  excess returns on day t .  
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4.2.3 Choice of estimation period 
By convention, the preference for the estimation period usually includes one year before the event, such as from 
day -245 till day -6 relative to the event day (Brown and Warner 1980, 1985), from day -250 to day -30 (Atkas 
2007) and from day -230 to day 131 (Liao et al. 2011). The choice of estimation period is somewhat arbitrary and 
barely justified (Aktas 2007).  
Another line of research finds that beta stationarity increased with the calendar period length but did not increase 
indefinitely (Theobald 1981). In the literature, there is no consensus about how long an estimation period should 
take to achieve a stable beta and the choice varies with choices of countries, sample periods and returns intervals 
(monthly or daily returns) (Theobald 1981; Daves et al. 2000; Diacogiannis and Marki 2008; Xia et al. 2006). 
Meanwhile confounding events would also contaminate the estimation periods and lead to less meaningful beta 
estimates (Fuller et al. 2002).  
Therefore we aim to select an estimation period which provides a relatively stable beta and which simultaneously 
has no significant confounding events. The last decade in China represents the final critical stage of the Chinese 
economic transition which has witnessed significant changes. Consequently in our study an estimation period 
greater than one year would confound with the SSSR and is not advised. However a one-year estimation period 
would just cover the minimum 12-month lockup period which provided a relatively stable period for firms to 
operate and probably help to yield a more stable beta. As a result, a one-year estimation period for our sample 
firms is probably the most appropriate choice compared to the other alternatives. Considering the potential impact 
of information leakages (or rumours) before the announcement, we also follow Aktas et al. (2007) to exclude 30 
days between the end of the estimation period and the lockup expiry to neutralize the impact. The final estimation 
period therefore covers eleven months before the lockup expiry (-255, -31).  
4.3 OLS pooled regression models 
We also run pooled OLS regressions to further examine our hypotheses. Because what we have are panel data, 
we have to consider the possibility that the OLS standard errors can be biased if there is time-series correlation 
(firm-effect) or/and the cross-sectional correlation (time-effect) in residuals. In the finance literature, according 
to Peterson (2009), 42% of the papers reviewed ignored this problem and the others arbitrarily chose a solution 
which was often incorrect and rarely explained.  He then examined different methods in varied situations and 
explained the similarities and differences.  
If these two effects4 are co-existent, the finance literature suggests that the OLS model is applied, the time 
dimension is estimated parametrically by including time dummies and then standard errors are clustered by firm 
given the number of firm observations is usually in excess of the number of time periods (Anderson and Reeb 
2003 Sapienza 2004; Faulkender and Petersen 2006 etc.). However, the OLS model may yield less efficient 
parametric estimates than the more efficient models, such as fixed-effect, GLS or GMM. Petersen (2009) then 
suggests using a more efficient model with standard errors clustered by firm and time dummies in order to obtain 
less biased standard errors and more efficient estimates.  
The endogeneity problem, which is a concern in the empirical corporate finance literature, is not a serious issue 
here. First the “normal” expiries were pre-determined in the reform proposals and impossible to be affected by 
the market. Second the “abnormal” expiries indicate that the involved government agencies didn’t fulfil their 
commitments and this was exogenous to the market.5  
                                                          
4 The residuals of a given firm may be correlated across years (time-series dependence). Petersen calls this a 
firm effect. The residuals of a given year may be correlated across different firms (cross-sectional dependence). 
Petersen calls this a time effect. If the firm-effect is fixed, firm dummies can completely capture the correlation 
across time. Similarly, if the time-effect is fixed, the time dummies completely remove the correlation between 
firms. 
5 The reasons given in the written documents regarding the delay in compensation are always linked to issues 
and problems within the firm or between the stakeholders, not the market. It is conceivable that there may be 
some market effect, but to a very small extent. The dominating or the deciding factor is exogenous.   
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Therefore we adopt the normal OLS model and same method as recommended in Peterson (2009) in order to 
control for the bias in the standard errors due to the potential correlation in the residuals.  
4.3.1 Variables and regression models 
We use CERs around each (first) lockup expiration day as our dependent variable on the left-hand side of our 
regressions. In order to test our hypotheses, we arrange our data in three groups, one full sample and two 
subsamples, and include four main independent variables.  
First we examine the subsample consisting of FIRST lockup expiries only (FIRST sub-sample 1 with 1066 
observations). We set a dummy which equals one when it is a “normal” expiry and zero when it is an “abnormal” 
expiry (Dnorm). Consistent with our hypothesis 1, we expect CERs around the FIRST “normal” expiry to be larger 
than those around the FIRST “abnormal” expiries and therefore positively related to the dummy. And the signals 
would be strengthened with the unlock size announced, that is, the market would respond more aggressively, 
either positively or negatively, to larger unlock-sizes (as a percentage of the total shares). We then interact this 
dummy with the unlock size at each expiration (Unlock) and expect the interaction term (Dnorm * Unlock) to be 
positively related to the CERs.   
Second, consistent with our hypotheses development, we ignore all the middle lockup expiries and construct a 
sub-sample consisting of all LAST expiries only (LAST sub-sample with 913 observations). We then combine 
the FIRST and the LAST sub-samples (FIRST-LAST subsample with 1979 observations). We define a dummy 
(Dlast) which equals one when it is the last expiry and zero otherwise. We expect CERs are positively related to 
Dlast (hypothesis 2). We then interact each dummy with the lockup size, Dlast * Unlock and expect the interaction 
term to be positively related with the CERs.   
Third we focus on the sub-sample consisting of LAST lockup expiries which carry the opposite information from 
the first lockup expiries (inconsistent sub-sample with 335 observations). In order to test our hypothesis 3, we 
define a dummy which equals one when there is an “abnormal to normal” change and zero where there is a “normal 
to abnormal” change (Dcha) and expect a positive coefficient on this dummy. We also interact this dummy with 
the unlock size at each expiry (Unlock) and expect the interaction term (Dcha * Unlock) to be positively related 
with the CERs too.  
Finally we also include yearly mutual fund ownership (MutHLD) of each firm during the sample period and expect 
a negative relationship between this variable and CERs (hypothesis 4).  
In addition, we follow the literature to include three conventional groups of control variables (Liao et al. 2011 
etc.). The first control group includes firm characteristics such as firm size (Size), firm performance (Perform), 
firm leverage (Lev) and firm-level agency problem (AP), proxied by the ratio of government shares over public 
shares. The second control group includes popular corporate governance variables such as the proportion of 
independent board directors (IndDir), whether a chairman simultaneously takes a dual responsibility as the CEO 
(Dual), and the largest ten shareholder’s ownership (LargHLD).  The third group controls the market factors such 
as the listing exchange (Exchange) and the market performance (Mktperform). Moreover, we control for the 
industries using the CSRC 1st level industry codes and also control for the years. Appendix 1 lists and explains all 
the variables used in the regressions.  
Here are the regression models applied in this paper:  
 Regression model 1 for the sub-sample of First lockup expiries (1066 observations) to test H1 and H4:  



n
j
ijiiiii ControlsMutHLDUnlockDnormDnormttCER
4
321 *),(   (1) 
 Regression model 2 for the combination of FIRST and LAST sub-samples to test H2 and H4 (1979 
observations):  
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
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j
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4
321 *),(   (2) 
 Regression model 3 for the sub-sample of Last lockup expiries which are  inconsistent with First lockup 
expiries to test H2 and H4 (335 observations):  



n
j
ijiiiii ControlsMutHLDUnlockDchaDchattCER
4
321 *),(   (3) 
We are aware that potential multicollinearity between the variables may affect the model specification and thus 
run the correlation matrix among all variables using Stata6. There is nothing worrying from this perspective. Most 
of the correlations are under 10% and the maximum correlation found is between Unlock and MutHLD (38.7%), 
which may not necessarily imply multicollinearity. In the unreported results, the VIF (variance inflation factor) 
statistics completely eliminate the concern.  
5 Results and Analysis  
In this section, we report the baseline results about the market performance (CERs with different event windows) 
as well as the regression results unfolding the drivers underlying the market performance.  
5.1 Baseline results 
5.1.1 Short-run market performance 
We have mainly investigated the short-run market performance around the lockup expiries and report the findings 
in Table 3.  
Table 3: The short-run cumulative excess returns 
 N ER0 CER(-1,1) 
Full Sample 3161 0.0058*** 0.0027*** 
Normal Expiries  1726 0.0055*** 0.0024* 
Abnormal Expiries 1435 0.0062*** 0.0030* 
Sub-sample: First Expiries 1066 0.0052*** 0.0012 
Normal Expiries 770 0.0054*** 0.0009 
Abnormal Expiries 296 0.0044*** 0.002 
Sub-sample: Last Expiries 913 0.0059*** 0.0058*** 
Normal Expiries 441 0.0056*** 0.0088*** 
Abnormal Expiries 472 0.0061*** 0.003 
Sub-sample: LAST inconsistent with FIRST 335 0.0052*** 0.0066*** 
Normal to Abnormal (NA) 288 0.0085*** 0.0046*** 
Abnormal to Normal (AN)  47 0.0047*** 0.0067*** 
 
ER0:Excess return on the announcement day 0; 
CER (-1,+1):cumulative excess return during the three-day event window covering day -1, day 0 and day +1; 
t statistics: *statistically significant at the 10% level  0.1, ** statistically significant at the 5% level , and *** statistically 
significant at the 1% level.   
 
The average three-day CER (-1, +1) based on the full sample (3161 observations) is 0.0027 (0.27%), significant 
at the 1% level. The “normal” group reports 0.0024 and the “abnormal” group reports 0.003, both statistically 
significant at the 10% level. And the excess returns on the announcement day (ER0) present a similar picture with 
                                                          
6 The results are not reported here but available on request.  
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an ER0 of 0.0055 for the “normal” group and 0.006 for the “abnormal” group, both significant at the 1% level. 
The “normal” group displays a CER (-1, +1) smaller than the “abnormal” group, which generally rejects our 
fundamental hypothesis that the market responds more favourably to the “normal” expiries than the “abnormal” 
expiries due to its signal of stronger IBP. But the majority of firms have multiple lockup expiries which are pooled 
together in our sample. As a result, the pooling may dilute or obscure the real signal. We then divide our sample 
into sub-samples to examine the hypothesis in more detail. 
First we focus on the FIRST expiries and assume that the subsequent lockup expiries don’t affect the market 
unless they carry additional information rather than the signal of IBP. We then examine the short-run market 
performance on the FIRST sub-sample which consists of all FIRST expiries and find that the ER0 and CER (-1, 
+1) are reported as 0.0052 (significant at the 1% level) and 0.0012 (insignificant) respectively. The difference 
between ER0 and CER (-1, +1) suggests the market reacted to the news instantly on the announcement day and 
then adjusted back to its routine average. This time the “normal” group reports a higher ER0 (0.0054) than the 
“abnormal” group does (0.0044), lending strong support to our H1. The fundamental hypothesis holds with the 
FIRST sub-sample, though fails with the total pooling sample. The “normal” group reports a lower CER (-1, +1) 
than the “abnormal” group (0.0009 vs 0.002), but both are insignificant. In this case, ER0 results are more 
informative than the insignificant CER (-1, +1) results. Furthermore it suggests that the post-announcement day 
witnesses a much more negative excess return for the “normal” group than the “abnormal” group, which reverses 
the higher ER0 for the “normal” group to the smaller insignificant CER (-1, +1). It could be simply due to that 
the market tended to overreact to the FIRST “normal” expiries on the announcement day and then adjust 
downwards to where it should be. It indicates the market perhaps over-reacted to the signal of stronger IBP sent 
out by the “normal” group and then calmed down in the three-day event window.  Probably because the market 
was concerned by the uncertainties that firms starting with first “normal” lockup expiry announcements may come 
up with “abnormal” lockup expiry announcements later on.  
Second we investigate the LAST sub-sample and compare the results with the above FIRST sub-sample results. 
The LAST group reports a higher ER0 (0.0059) than the FIRST group (0.0052), both significant at the 1% level. 
And the LAST group also reports a significant three-day CER (-1, +1) of 0.0058 while the FIRST group reports 
insignificant CER (-1, +1) of 0.0012. These findings support our H2 that the last expiries in general signal a huge 
relief for both the government and the investors and also put a satisfactory ending to the long saga of unlocking 
government shares after the SSSR and therefore the market in general reacted more favourably to the last expiries 
than the first expiries. In addition, within the LAST sub-sample, the LAST “normal” group reports a higher CER 
(-1, +1), almost three times larger than reported by the LAST “abnormal” group (0.0088 significant at the 1% 
level vs 0.003 insignificant), but a slightly lower ER0 (0.0056 vs 0.0061). The discrepancy indicates the positive 
market reaction for the “normal” group persisted and intensified after the announcement day while the reactions 
for the “abnormal” group mostly concentrated on the announcement day. This also implies the market tended to 
underreact to the LAST “normal” expiries on the announcement day and adjust upwards to where it should be in 
the three-day event window. It seems the market responded more slowly to the signal contained in the “normal” 
expiries than in the “abnormal” expiries. In this circumstance, CER (-1, +1) is more accurate than ER0 in terms 
of capturing the real market response.   
Third we check each last expiration against its corresponding first expiry to see if there is any change from “normal” 
first to “abnormal” last or the other way around. We then focus on the sub-sample consisting of those with changes 
only and further subdivide this “inconsistent” sub-sample into “normal to abnormal” (NA) sub-group and 
“abnormal to normal” (AN) sub-group. We find the “NA” sub-group reports a lower CER (-1, +1) than the “AN” 
sub-group (0.0046 vs 0.0067), both significant at the 1% level. This finding backs our H3 that “AN” change 
signals an improvement in the IBP and thus should solicit more favourable market response. However the ER0 
results show just the opposite with the “NA” sub-group displays a higher ER0 than the “AN” sub-group (0.0085 
vs 0.0047), both significant at the 1% level. The market seems to overreact to “NA” change but underreact to 
“AN” change on the announcement day and then it adjusts to where they should be using the three-day event 
window. We thus rely more on the CER (-1, +1) results because we think the three-day event window captures 
the market response more accurately.  
Overall, our general hypothesis holds with the sub-samples where the confounding effects from the multiple 
lockup expiries are removed. It confirms our proposition that the “normal” expiries signal stronger IBP of 
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investors than the “abnormal” expiries and therefore evoke a more positive market response. And the market also 
saw through the improvement in terms of IBP over time and responded accordingly.  
5.1.2 Long-run market performance 
Apart from the short-run performance, we would also like to investigate the long-run market performance after 
the lockup expiries for comparison and a different perspective. We calculate the CERs covering one month after 
the lockup expiration till one year after that is 31 working days till 255 working days after the lockup expiration 
announcements. Table 4 reports the results for CER (31, 255) for our samples.  
Table 4: The long-run cumulative excess returns 
  N CER(31,255) 
Full Sample 3161 -0.0457*** 
Normal Expiries  1726 -0.0135 
Abnormal Expiries 1435 -0.0838*** 
Sub-sample: First Expiries 1066 -0.0436** 
Normal Expiries  770 -0.0269 
Abnormal Expiries 296 -0.0884*** 
Sub-sample: Last Expiries 913 -0.0602*** 
Normal Expiries  441 -0.0127 
Abnormal Expiries 472 -0.1041*** 
Sub-sample: LAST inconsistent with FIRST 335 -0.066*** 
Normal to Abnormal (NA) 288 -0.0826*** 
Abnormal to Normal (AN) 47 -0.0503*** 
CER (31,255):long-run cumulative excess return covering from working day 33 till day 255 after the announcement; 
t statistics: *statistically significant at the 10% level  0.1, ** statistically significant at the 5% level , and *** statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
   
Based on the full sample (3161 observations), the “normal” group reports insignificantly negative long-run CER 
(-0.0135), while the “abnormal” group reports a much more negative long-run CER significant at the 1% level (-
0.0838). In other words, in the long-run, the “abnormal” expiries were related to negative “abnormal” performance 
while the “normal” expiries were related to normal performance.  
Using the FIRST sub-sample (1066 observations), we are left with the same impression that the “abnormal” 
expiries led to undesirable long-run market performance (-0.0884 significant at the 1% level) while the “normal” 
expiries were linked with normal long-run performance (-0.0269 CER insignificant). The LAST sub-sample 
results reinforce this conclusion with an insignificantly negative long-run CER for the “normal” expiries (-0.0127) 
and a significant more negative long-run CER for the “abnormal” expiries (-0.1041). 
When examining the “inconsistent” sub-sample, we find that both the “NA” and the “AN” sub-groups deliver 
significantly negative long-run CERs, -0.0826 and -0.0503 respectively. It indicates that the LAST expiries with 
changes from the FIRST group, regardless of whether it is a “normal to abnormal” change or an “abnormal to 
normal” change, were related to unfavourable long-run market performance. But the “NA” sub-group shows a 
more negative long-run CER than the “AN” sub-group, consistent with the same conclusion drawn with the 
previous samples that the “abnormal” expiries were connected with worse long-run market performance than the 
“normal” expiries. 
This general conclusion with the long-run market performance implies that the market, in the long-run, 
unambiguously recognised that the “normal” expiries signal stronger IBP than “abnormal” expiries and therefore 
the “normal” expiries were related to better long-term performance, supporting our main hypothesis  
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5.1.3 Summary  
It appears that the “normal” expiries indicate that investors have stronger IBP against the government while the 
“abnormal” expiries means relatively weaker IBP against the government. The market was also able to swiftly 
recognise and reflect improvements in the IBP if a firm switched from an abnormal to a normal expiry. 
Furthermore this perception by the market was persistent in the long-run as well.  
5.2 OLS regression results  
The regression results will help us to understand the driving factors underlying the short-run and long-run market 
performance.  
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics for all the numerical variables applied in this paper. We compare the 
results from the full pooling sample, the FIRST sub-sample and the LAST sub-sample.  The mean of unlocked 
size at each expiration is 10.27% with the full sample, but 4.63% with the FIRST sub-sample and as large as 
18.88% with the LAST sub-sample. The pattern shows that the government attempted to unlock fewer shares at 
the beginning but many more when approaching the end of the process. This generally complies with the 
requirements set by the government in the original proposal to restrict the sales of government shares up to 36 
months after the SSSR.  
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 The full polling sample 
 Mean Median SD Max Min 
Unlocked 0.1027 0.05 0.132 0.7237 0 
MulHLD 0.10065 0.01345 0.1692 1.16975 0 
Size 21.7274 21.6888 1.3312 28.5075 15.7152 
Leverage 0.5549 0.5375 0.3945 11.5097 -0.1947 
ROE 0.83785 0.10515 23.88515 758.55635 -14.1984 
Dual 0.1403 0 0.3473 1 0 
IndDir 0.3641 0.3333 0.053 0.6667 0.0909 
LargHLD 0.0669 0.03175 0.09945 1.4487 0.00255 
MktPerform 0.00405 0.00795 0.035 0.1045 -0.1316 
  First sub-sample 
 Mean Median SD Max Min 
Unlocked 0.0463 0.05 0.0392 0.3807 0.0001 
MulHLD 0.0739 0.0067 0.1253 0.8514 0 
Size 21.5624 21.538 1.2597 28.3576 15.7152 
Leverage 0.5585 0.53 0.474 11.5097 0.0108 
ROE 0.75 0.0692 22.448 713.2036 -12.7601 
Dual 0.1366 0 0.3436 1 0 
IndDir 0.3615 0.3333 0.0502 0.6 0.1818 
LargHLD 0.0452 0.0204 0.0703 1.1372 0.0018 
MktPerform 0.004 0.0069 0.0247 0.0652 -0.0919 
 Last sub-sample 
 Mean Median SD Max Min 
Unlocked 0.2027 0.1888 0.1626 0.7237 0.0001 
MulHLD 0.0535 0.0135 0.0878 0.6367 0 
Size 21.9483 21.8725 1.3705 28.5075 15.7294 
Leverage 0.5403 0.5368 0.2894 5.7783 -0.1947 
ROE 0.1757 0.0719 2.8743 90.7055 -2.8766 
Dual 0.1366 0 0.3436 1 0 
IndDir 0.3681 0.3333 0.0534 0.5714 0.2 
LargHLD 0.0434 0.0227 0.0583 0.623 0.0015 
MktPerform 0.0001 0.0021 0.0206 0.0786 -0.0794 
Unlocked: The percentage of shares expired in each expiry date; MulHLD: The percentage of shares held by the mutual 
funds; Size: The natural logarithm of the total assets of the year before; Leverage: The ratio of total liability to total assets 
of the year before; ROE: Return on equity the year before; Dual: Dummy variable. If in the previous year, the chairman 
of the directors’ board and the CEO are the same person, the variable equals 1; otherwise, 0; IndDir: The percentage of 
independent directors of the year before; LargHLD: The percentage of shares held by the first shareholder of the year 
before; MktPerform: The annual market-adjusted stock return. 
 
Mutual funds held on average 7.39% of the total shares with the FIRST sub-sample and 5.35% with the LAST 
sub-sample, comparable to the reported level of mutual funds’ ownership in the US (Yuan et al. 2008) and also in 
accordance with the strategic decision made by Chinese Government since 2000 to develop mutual funds as 
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institutional investors apart from the state-owned banks and financial institutions. From the table, we see the 
mutual fund ownership decreases by around one quarter from the First to the Last sub-sample. Given the mutual 
funds in China are always criticised as being directly or indirectly connected with Chinese government-level 
authorities (Firth et al. 2010), it indicates that the mutual funds shrank their relative shareholding as the firms went 
through the lockup expiry process.7 
There is not much difference with the control variables between the two sub-samples except the ROE and the 
annual market adjusted stock returns (MktPerform). The mean ROE decreases hugely from the FIRST to LAST 
sub-sample (from 0.7500 to 0.1757) while the medians remain at the same level. It maybe because the equity 
value of the government shares used to be estimated using the book value since officially the government shares 
were not allowed to be traded on the market before the SSSR. However around the last expiries, most of firms 
have already unlocked a decent size of the government shares which therefore valued at the market price rather 
than book price. The MktPerform also decreased enormously probably because many last expiries overlapped 
with the global financial crisis.  
5.2.2 Regressions against the market performance 
We perform the regression analysis and report the regression results in Table 6.  
 Model 1 
Model 1 is based on the FIRST sub-sample (1066 observations). When regressed against CER (-1, +1), the 
coefficient of dummy Dnorm is negative (-0.0111), significant at the 10% level, which is contrary to our 
expectation of a positive relationship, rejecting our H1. The CER (-1, +1) results analysed in section 5.1, though 
insignificant, show that the “abnormal” expiries have a higher mean CER (-1, +1) than the “normal” expiries and 
therefore there is no surprise to find a negative connection between CER (-1, +1) and the dummy Dnorm in the 
regression. But the interaction term Dnorm * Unlock, however, has a positive coefficient estimate of 0.1379, 
significant at the 5% level, consistent with our expectation. Given Unlock has a positive coefficient estimate of 
0.0247, the coefficient on the interactions term means the “normal” expiries strengthen the positive impact of 
Unlock, and therefore indirectly have a positive impact on the CER (-1, +1) and thus it lends some support, though 
not strong support, to H1. Neither Dnorm nor Dnorm * Unlock are statistically significant factors when regressed 
against ER0 or long-run CER (31, 255).  
The coefficients on MulHLD report negative (-0.0065) with ER0 but positive (0.0057) with CER (-1, +1), however 
both are insignificant. The coefficient becomes a definite negative (-0.300) and statistically significant with CER 
(31, 255), consistent with our H4. It seems the negative impact of mutual fund ownership is unnoticeable and 
ambiguous in the short-run but becomes apparent and definite in the long-run.  
 Model 2  
Model 2 is based on the combination of the FIRST and the LAST sub-samples (1979 observations). When the 
dependant variable is CER (-1, +1), the coefficient on the dummy Dlast is 0.0137, statistically significant at the 
1% level, consistent with our expectation. And the interaction term Dlast * Unlock also has a significant positive 
coefficient (0.0283), in accordance with our expectations too. The combination supports our H2 strongly. Both 
variables show insignificant coefficients when regressed against ER0, but report larger and more significant 
coefficients when regressed against CER (31, 255), which means, H2 is robustly supported even in the long-run. 
The impact of Dnorm is insignificant with all the dependant variables, indicating that in this case, where it is a 
“normal” or “abnormal” expiration is not as important as whether it is a “first” or “last” expiration.  
                                                          
7 The mutual funds were controlled by the government-owned organisations which also held shares in the listed 
companies. When these organisations sold their share in a state-owned company to the market, the mutual fund 
were following their examples. It is probably because mutual funds, when holding shares in a listed SOE 
together with the controlling government organisations, would have advantages in that listed SOE due to the 
connection. Once the government organisation was out or gestured to get out, the advantages they used to have 
disappeared or were likely to disappear. Thus they might want to withdraw accordingly. 
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The coefficients on MulHLD imply a similar story as the Model 1 suggests that its impact is trivial in the short-
run but turns to a very negative power in the long-run with a coefficient estimate of -0.6715 statistically significant 
at the 1% level, which indicates that H4 is strongly supported in the long run.  
 Model 3 
Model 3 is based on the sub-sample of last expiries with changes (335 observations). The coefficients on the 
dummy Dcha are all positive and statistically insignificant no matter which dependant variables is regressed 
against, which means the dummy on its own is not as critical as we expect. Then we move to the coefficients on 
the interaction term Dcha * Unlock, which are all positive but, again, statically insignificant. The signs of all the 
coefficients on the interaction terms support our H3, but impaired by the insignificance of the coefficients. The 
regression results suggest that H3 holds with our sub-sample but are not strongly supported. The coefficients on 
MulHLD repeat the same story as the previous models reveal and indicate that H4 is supported in the long-run 
CER (31, 255).  
For all the three models, the value of adjusted R-squared increases with the length of the event windows, indicating 
the variables chosen are more meaningful with longer event windows.  
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Table 6: The OLS regression results 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  ER0 CER(-1,1) CER(31,255) ER0 CER(-1,1) CER(31,255) ER0 CER(-1,1) CER(31,255) 
DNorm -0.0013 -0.0111* -0.0284 -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0601 
   
DNorm×Unlocked 0.0476 0.1379** 0.0273 
      
Dlast       0.0021 0.0137*** 0.2188*** 
   
Dlast×Unlocked       0.0017 0.0283* 0.3022** 
   
Dcha             0.0052 0.0083 0.0392 
Dcha×Unlocked             0.0086 0.0367 0.0843 
Unlocked 0.0097 0.0247*** 0.3419***       0.0076 0.0365** 0.3899*** 
MulHLD -0.0065 0.0057 -0.3000* -0.0039 0.0191 -0.6715*** -0.0041 0.0193 -0.6418*** 
Size 0.0025** 0.0023 -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0289** 0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0305** 
Leverage -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.1070*** -0.0041 -0.0136** 0.0298 -0.0045 -0.0143** 0.0338 
ROE 0 0.0001 0 0.0007 0.0002 -0.0139** 0.0006 0.0002 -0.0144** 
Dual -0.0003 -0.001 -0.0814 -0.0067* -0.0086 0.0453 -0.0066* -0.0083 0.0443 
IndDir 0.0111 -0.0078 -0.1182 -0.0252 -0.0215 -0.1452 -0.0238 -0.019 -0.1178 
LargHLD 0.005 0.0223 0.0059 -0.0353 -0.0397 -0.48 -0.0378* -0.0445 -0.6458** 
Exchange -0.0026 0.0054 0.0415 -0.0031 0.0009 -0.0414 -0.0027 0.0014 -0.0405 
MktPerform -0.0194 -0.1237 1.5237** -0.0023 0.0721 -0.613 -0.0022 0.067 -0.625 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant -0.0882** -0.0463 -0.6962 0.0465 0.0708 1.1984*** 0.0456 0.0683 1.1759*** 
Adj-R2 -0.003 0.028 0.075 0.012 0.009 0.1 0.013 0.01 0.104 
t statistics: *statistically significant at the 10% level  0.1, ** statistically significant at the 5% level , and *** statistically significant at the 1% level; 
Please refer to appendix 1 for the definitions of all the variables.  
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5.2.3 Robustness check 
In this sub-section, we vary the length of the event windows of CERs for the robust checks. For example, we 
regress the core variables against CER (-2, +2), CER (-3, +3), CER (-5, +5), CER (-10, +10), CER (-15, +15), 
CER (-20, +20), CER (-25, +25) and CER (-30, +30) respectively and report the results in appendix 2.  
 Model 1  
Based on Model 1, the coefficients on dummy Dnorm are all significantly negative across all event windows. The 
interaction term Dnorm * Unlock persistently shows a significant positive coefficient with an event window 
shorter or equal to (-5, +5) but the significance disappears with a longer event window. The results reinforce what 
we have derived previously with the Model 1 that H1 is not directly supported by the regression results, but 
partially and indirectly supported with the event windows no longer than (-5, +5).  
 Model 2 
The dummy Dlast and the interaction term Dlast * Unlock have positive coefficients with all the event windows 
we test and therefore strongly support our H2.  
 Model 3  
The dummy Dcha reports significant and positive coefficients with event windows equal to or longer than (-3, 
+3), which unambiguously supports our H3. Meanwhile the coefficients on the interaction term Dcha * Unlock 
are positive with all the event windows, but significant only with CER (-2, +2) and CER (-15, +15).  
Additionally the coefficient on the variable MulHLD are all insignificant. The results are consistent across all 
three models and all the event windows tested, which indicates the mutual fund ownership is not a driving factor 
underlying the short-term market performance.  
5.2.4 Summary 
The regression results provide an opportunity to further examine baseline results and the hypotheses made. 
Generally speaking, H1 is partially supported with the Model 1 results, H2 is strongly and robustly supported 
despite of any variations or adjustments made about Model 2, H3 is supported with the Model 3 results but slightly 
impaired by the insignificance of the coefficients reported with a few event-windows CERs, while H4 is 
universally supported with the long-run event window.  
6 Conclusion  
This paper investigates the market performance around the lockup expiries of the Chinese government shares after 
the secondary privatisation in China in 2005. Due to the unique feature of the Chinese SSSR, the whole picture is 
complicated with the popularity of multiple lockup expiries, which exist for the vast majority of the sample firms 
and vary from firm to firm. Due to this complexity, there is limited research about the lockup expiries after the 
SSSR in China except for Liao et al. (2011) which uses incomplete one-year data and ignores the existence of 
multiple lockup expiries. More generally speaking, this type of research on the market reactions around the lockup 
expiries after a critical event, such as IPO or SEO, is under-investigated in the literature, which mainly attempts 
to explain the abnormal market reactions from a perspective of market inefficiencies or from a view of “permanent” 
signal constantly sent out by firms (Field and Hanka 2001, Hakim et al. 2012, Liao et al. 2011). In this paper we 
have critically discussed the previous theories and propose that the market reactions should be examined with a 
deep understanding of the characteristics of the event itself, such as the terms and conditions specified relative to 
the resulting lockup expiries and by doing so the explanations put forward are based on a customised close 
investigation and therefore are more likely to be plausible and convincing. We then make our own hypothesis, 
which fits into our specific context in China. We categorise “normal” and “abnormal” first lockup expiries, with 
the “normal” expiries conforming to the dates written in the original proposals and the “abnormal” expiries 
deviating from the proposals. We argue that the “normal” expiries indicate the investors have stronger implicit 
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bargaining power against the government while the “abnormal” expiries mean the opposite. We are the first to 
use the term “implicit bargaining power” which is derived from the “implicit contracts” from management 
research.  We believe that the investors in China, although they do not appear to be very powerful when viewed 
from the outside in the short-term, are actually passively aggressive in the long-term and powerful enough to 
negotiate with the government to achieve what they desire. And we also argue that the Chinese market can see 
through this and react accordingly. This study looks into the market reactions around the lockup expiries after the 
SSSR and helps us to find out whether our argument is supported or not.  
We estimate the CERs with different event windows and also run the regression models to examine our main 
hypothesis that “normal” expiry dates indicate that minority investors have stronger implicit bargaining powers 
than investors in firms with “abnormal” expiry dates. We find that our hypothesis doesn’t hold with the full 
pooling sample which is contaminated by noise from the existence of multiple lockup expiries, but generally holds 
with our sub-samples consisting of first or last expiries only. In general, the short-run CERs are higher for the 
“normal” expiries than the “abnormal” expiries. We also find the long-run CERS results persistently support our 
main hypothesis. Additionally the market is wise enough to even react to the improvements in the implicit 
bargaining power, signalled by the change from the “abnormal” first to the “normal” last expiries. Furthermore 
we test the impact of mutual fund ownership and conclude that its impact is almost invisible in the short-run but 
exerts a strong negative effect in the long-run.  
We contribute to the literature from the following two aspects. First we complete the data and are the first to 
consider carefully the phenomenon of multiple lockup expiry dates. We are the first to capture a full picture of 
lockup expiries after the privatisation. Second we are the first to propose the term of “implicit bargaining power” 
of investors to explain the market reactions observed in China around lockup expiry dates and this is supported 
generally by our results. Previous literature tends to refer to universal reasons underlying the market reactions but 
we suggest customising the investigation to the particular events in particular environments before putting forward 
any plausible explanations. Specifically, we hypothesise that deviations from the actual dates specified in the 
original agreements signal future performance, which is empirically supported with our evidence. Further research 
may be required to investigate how the market responds around the announcements of the real sales of government 
shares in order to extend our findings relating to the announcements of lock-up expiries.  
  
22 
 
References 
Aktas N, De Bodt E, Cousin JG (2007) Event studies with a contaminated estimation period. J Corp Financ 
13(1):129-145 
Anderson RC, Reeb DM (2003) Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the S&P 500. 
J. Finance. 58: 1301-1328 
Barclay M, Litzenberger R (1988) Announcement effects of New Equity Issues and the Use of Intraday Price 
Data. J Financ Econ 21: 71-99 
Binder JJ (1998) The event study methodology since 1969. Rev Quant Financ Acc 11(2):111-137 
Boehmer E, Musumeci E, Poulsen A (1991) Event-Study Methodology under Conditions of Event-Induced 
Variance. J Financ Econ 30:253-272 
Brown LD, Griffin PA, Hagerman RL, Mark E. Zmijewski ME (1987) An evaluation of alternative proxies for 
the market's assessment of unexpected earnings. J Accounting Econ, 9: 153–193 
Brown S, Warner J (1980) Measuring security price performance. J Financ Econ 8(3):205-258 
Brown S, Warner J (1985) Using Daily Stock Returns: The Case of Event Studies. J Financ Econ 14:3-31 
Campbell CJ, Wasley CE (1993) Measuring security price performance using daily NASDAQ returns. J Financ 
Econ 33(1):73-92 
Cao C, Field LC, Hanka G (2004) Does Insider Trading Impair Market Liquidity? Evidence from IPO Lockup 
Expiries. J Financ Quant Anal 39:25-46 
Chandra R, Moriarty S, Willinger GL(1990) A Re-Examination of the Power Alternative Return-Generating 
Models and the Effect of Accounting for Cross-Sectional Dependencies in Event Studies. J  Accounting 
Res 28:398-408 
Chen GM, Firth M, Xu LP (2009) Does the Type of Ownership Control Matter? Evidence from China’s Listed 
Companies. J Bank Financ 33:171–181 
Chong BS, Liu Z (2016) CAR associated with SEO share lockups: Real or illusionary? Rev Quant Financ Acc 
47(3):513-541 
Cornett MM, Marcus AJ, Saunders A, Tehranian H (2007) The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Corporate 
Operating Performance. J Bank Financ 31:1771-1794 
Corrado C (1989) A Nonparametric Test for Abnormal Security-Price Performance in Event Studies. J Financ 
Econ 23:385-395 
Corrado CJ, Zivney TL (1992) The specification and power of the sign test in event study hypothesis tests using 
daily stock returns. J Financ Quan Anal 27:465-478 
Cumming D, Hou W (2014) Valuation of restricted shares by conflicting shareholders in the Split Share 
Structure Reform. Eur J Financ 20 (7-9):778-802 
Daves PR, Ehrhardt MC, Kunkel RA (2000) Estimating Systematic Risk: The Choice Of Return Interval And 
Estimation Period. J Financ Strategic Decisions 13(1): 7-13 
Diacogiannis G, Marki P (2008) Estimating Betas in Thinner Markets: The Case of the Athens Stock. J Bank 
Financ 13(1): 41-64 
Errunza V, Miller D (2003) Valuation effects of seasoned global equity offerings. J Bank Financ 27(9):1611-
1623 
Fama EF, Fisher L, Jensen MC, Roll R (1969) The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information. Intl Econ 
Rev 10: 1–21 
Fama EF, French KR (1996) Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies. J Financ 51:55-84 
Faulkender M, Petersen MA (2006) Does the source of capital affect capital structure? Rev Financ Stud 19(1): 
45-79 
Field L, Hanka G (2001) The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups. J Financ 56(2):471-500 
Firth M, Lin C, Zou H (2010) Friend or foe? The role of state and mutual fund ownership in the split share 
structure reform in China. J Financ Quant Anal 45(3):685-706 
Fuller K, Netter J, Stegemoller M (2002) What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? Evidence from firms that 
make many acquisitions. J Financ 57(4): 1763-1793 
Gerwin VDL, Van Ees H, Van Witteloostuijn A (2008) Corporate Social and Financial Performance: An 
Extended Stakeholder Theory, and Empirical Test with Accounting Measures. J Bus Ethics 79: 299-310 
Gillian SL, Hartzell JC, Parrino R (2009) Explicit versus implicit contracts: Evidence from CEO employment 
agreements. J Financ 64(4):1629-1655 
Hakim T, Lypny G, Bhabra HS (2012) IPO Lockup Expiration in the Middle East and North Africa. J Mult 
Financ Manage 22:252-262 
23 
 
Helper S, Sake M (1995) Supplier Relations in Japan and the United States: Are They Converging? Sloan 
Manage Rev 36:77-84 
Hou W, Lee E (2014) Split Share Structure Reform, corporate governance, and the foreign share discount puzzle 
in China. Eur J Financ 20(7-9): 703-727  
Huang Y, Uchida K, Zha D (2016) Market Timing of Seasoned Equity Offerings with Long Regulative Process. 
J Corp Financ 39:278-294 
Jensen M, Meckling W (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure. J Financ Econ 3(4): 305-360 
Karpoff JM, Lee G, Masulis RW (2013) Contracting Under Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Lockup 
Agreements in Seasoned Equity Offerings. J Financ Econ 110: 607-626 
Khurshed A, Tong Y, Wang M (2015) Split-share structure reform and the underpricing of Chinese initial public 
offerings. Eur J Financ DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2015.1107603 
Kolari JW, Pynnönen S (2010) Event study testing with cross-sectional correlation of ARs. Rev Financ Stud 
23(11):3996-4025 
Kothari SP, Warner JB (2007) Econometrics of Event Studies. In. Eckbo BE (ed.) Handbook of Corporate 
Finance: Empirical Corporate Finance, Elsevier, North-Holland 
Lee PM (1997) A Comparative Analysis of Layoff Announcements and Stock Price Reactions in the United 
States and Japan. Strat Manage J 18: 879-894 
Li K, Wang T, Cheung YL, Jiang P (2011) Privatization and risk sharing: evidence from the split share structure 
reform in China. Rev Financ Stud 24(7):2499-2525 
Liao L, Liu BB, Wang H (2011) Information Discovery in Share Lockups: Evidence from the Split-Share 
Structure Reform in China. Financ Manage 40(4):1001-1027  
Liu N, Bredin D, Wang L, Yi Z (2014) Domestic and foreign institutional investors’ behavior in China. Eur J 
Financ 20:(7-9) 728-751 
Loderer C, Cooney JW, Drunen L (1991) The Price Elasticity of Demand for Common Stock. J Financ 46:621-
651  
MacKinlay AC (1997) Event studies in economics and finance. J Econ Lit 35:13-39 
Masulis RW, Korwar AN (1986) Seasoned equity offerings: An empirical investigation. J Financ Econ 15: 91-
118 
Mikkelson WH, Partch MM (1985) Stock price effects and costs of secondary distributions. J Financ Econ 
14(2):165-194 
Mikkelson WH, Partch MM (1986) Valuation effects of security offerings and the issuance process. J Financ 
Econ 15(1-2) 30-60 
Mikkelson WH, Partch MM (1988) Withdrawn security offerings. J Financ Quant Anal 2:119-134 
Nakamura E, Steinsson J (2011) Price Setting in Forward-Looking Customer Markets. J Monetary Econ 58:220-
233 
Petersen MA (2009) Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Rev. Finan. 
Stud 22(1): 435-480 
Ramnath S (2002) Investor and Analyst Reactions to Earnings Announcements of Related Firms: An Empirical 
Analysis. J Accounting Res 40:1351-1376 
Rendleman RJ, Charles PJ, Latané HA (1987) Further insight into the standardized unexpected earnings 
anomaly: size and serial correlation effects. Financ Rev 22(1): 131-144 
Ross SA (1976) The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. J Econ Theory 13(3): 341-60 
Salinger MA (1992) Value Event Studies. Rev Econ Stat 671-677 
Sapienza P (2004) The effects of government ownership on bank lending. J Financ Econ 72(2): 357-384 
Scholes MS (1972) The Market for Securities: Substitution versus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information 
on Share Prices. J Bus 45(2): 179-211 
Theobald M (1981 Beta Stationarity and Estimation Period: Some Analytical Results. J Financ Quan Anal 16 
(5):747-757 
Xia HP, Cai X, Wu F (2006) Estimation of β Coefficient and Analysis of Its Stationarity. J Modern Accounting 
Auditing 12(10): 23-27 
Yuan RL, Xiao JZZ, Zou H (2008) Mutual funds’ ownership and firm performance: Evidence from China. J 
Bank Financ 32(8): 1552-1565 
Zeng Y, McLaren J (2015) The Impact of Large Public Sales of Government Assets: Empirical Evidence from 
the Chinese Stock Markets on A Gradual and Offer-to-Get Approach. Rev Quant Financ Account 45: 
137-173  
24 
 
Zheng SX, Ogden JP, Jen FC (2005) Pursuing value through liquidity in IPOs: underpricing, share retention, 
lockup, and trading volume relationships. Rev Quant Financ Account 25:293–312 
  
25 
 
Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The Definition of Variables 
Variable Definition Measurement 
),( ttCERi   
Cumulative excess 
returns. 
Using the market model to estimate the expected rate of return, 
day 0 is expiry date. From day –t to +t is the event window. 
Dnorm Normal expiries Dummy Variable. If the expiry date is the same as the date set in 
the reform announcement, the variable equals 1; otherwise, 0. 
Unlocked Scale of expiration The percentage of shares expired in each expiry date. 
Dcha Change from the first 
to the last expiration 
Dummy which equals 1 when there is a “abnormal to normal” 
change and 0 where there is an “normal to abnormal” change 
Dlast The last expiry date. Dummy variable. If the expiry date is the last one of the series 
expiry dates, the variable equals 1 and 0 otherwise. 
MulHLD The mutual fund 
ownership 
The percentage of shares held by the mutual funds 
IndDir Independence of 
directors board 
The percentage of independent directors in the previous year. 
Dual Separation of chairman 
and CEO 
Dummy variable. If in the previous year, the chairman of the 
directors’ board and the CEO are the same person, the variable 
equals 1; otherwise, 0. 
LargHLD 
Largest ten 
shareholder’s holdings 
The percentage of shares held by the largest ten shareholder in the 
previous year. 
Size Size of assets The natural logarithm of the total assets in the previous year. 
Lev Financial leverage The ratio of total liability to total assets in the previous year. 
ROE Profitability  Return on equity in the previous year.. 
MktPerform Market performance The annual market-adjusted stock return 
Exchange 
Listing stock exchange Dummy variable. If the company is listed in Shanghai stock 
exchange, the variable equals 1; if the company is listed in 
Shenzhen stock exchange, the variable equals 0 
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Appendix 2 
The regression results against CERs with varying event windows 
Model 1 
  CER(-2,2) CER(-3,3) CER(-5,5) CER(-10,10) CER(-15,15) CER(-20,20) CER(-25,25) CER(-30,30) 
DNorm -0.0158** -0.0205** -0.0310*** -0.0402** -0.0366** -0.0439** -0.0445* -0.0718*** 
DNorm×Unlocked 0.1796** 0.1723* 0.2221* 0.0869 0.0914 0.3388 0.2557 0.4641 
MulHLD 0.0023 0.0068 0.0209 0.0312 0.0205 0.0423 0.0353 0.0762 
Size 0.0039 0.0056* 0.0068* 0.0068 0.0075 0.0038 0.0067 -0.0006 
Leverage 0.0009 -0.003 -0.0014 0.0111 0.0147 0.0151 -0.0024 -0.0019 
ROE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 
Dual -0.0008 -0.0074 -0.0208* -0.0361** -0.0378** -0.02 -0.0459* -0.0488* 
IndDir 0.0087 0.0085 -0.0114 0.0389 0.05 0.1164 0.1934 0.1943 
Hld1_9 0.0212 -0.0103 0.0698 0.0457 0.1111 0.1781 0.1409 0.0486 
Exchange -0.0009 0.0029 0.004 0.0019 0.0025 0.0132 0.0103 0.0199 
MktPerform -0.1912* -0.1523 -0.0422 0.1451 0.0984 0.321 0.3283 0.6534* 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant -0.0923 -0.1257 -0.1145 -0.2138 -0.2859 -0.2462 -0.3184 -0.1735 
Adj-R2 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.037 
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Model 2 
  CER(-2,2) CER(-3,3) CER(-5,5) CER(-10,10) CER(-15,15) CER(-20,20) CER(-25,25) CER(-30,30) 
Dlast 0.0131** 0.0137* 0.0234*** 0.0433*** 0.0488** 0.0533*** 0.0626*** 0.0709*** 
Normal -0.0049 -0.0146 -0.0227* -0.0335** -0.0336* -0.0414** -0.0493** -0.0356 
Dlast×Unlocked 0.0451** 0.0446 0.0657* 0.1137** 0.1086** 0.1578*** 0.1468** 0.1229* 
MulHLD 0.0154 0.0106 0.0613 -0.0082 -0.0183 -0.0164 -0.0256 -0.0371 
Size -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0051 -0.0046 -0.0077 -0.0181*** -0.0169** -0.0158** 
Leverage -0.0141* -0.0116 0.0046 0.0146 0.0219 0.0099 0.0063 0.0064 
ROE 0.0001 -0.0011 -0.002 -0.0025 -0.003 -0.0022 -0.0017 -0.0025 
Dual -0.0066 -0.0111 -0.0144 -0.0185 -0.0228 -0.0275 -0.0356 -0.0295 
IndDir 0.0114 0.0091 0.0168 0.0697 0.0281 0.0454 0.0206 0.0713 
Hld1_9 -0.0577 -0.0892 -0.1435* -0.1461 -0.1222 -0.1131 -0.1257 -0.1089 
Exchange 0.0024 0.007 -0.0017 -0.0072 -0.006 -0.0058 0.006 0.0031 
MktPerform 0.0199 0.1623 0.152 0.2407 0.332 0.5887* 0.3659 0.425 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant 0.0731 0.0519 0.1381 0.0995 0.1177 0.3629* 0.3436 0.2429 
Adj-R2 0.009 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.011 0.039 0.024 0.029 
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Model 3 
  CER(-2,2) CER(-3,3) CER(-5,5) CER(-10,10) CER(-15,15) CER(-20,20) CER(-25,25) CER(-30,30) 
Dcha 0.009 0.0272** 0.0336** 0.0362** 0.0573*** 0.0610*** 0.0707*** 0.0663** 
Dcha×Unlocked 0.0544* 0.0806 0.0854 0.0773 0.1514* 0.1633* 0.1365 0.1443 
MulHLD 0.0154 0.0064 0.059 -0.0063 -0.0194 -0.0152 -0.0209 -0.0322 
Unlocked 0.0509*** 0.0479 0.0758** 0.1215*** 0.1499*** 0.1935*** 0.2062*** 0.1996*** 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.0055 -0.0051 -0.0086* -0.0191*** -0.0183*** -0.0172** 
Leverage -0.0149* -0.013 0.0037 0.0143 0.0203 0.0083 0.0058 0.0052 
ROE 0 -0.0012 -0.0022 -0.0028 -0.0033 -0.0026 -0.0022 -0.003 
Dual -0.0062 -0.0109 -0.0145 -0.0192 -0.0224 -0.0274 -0.0358 -0.0289 
IndDir 0.0143 0.0175 0.0287 0.0854 0.0481 0.0684 0.0486 0.0956 
Hld1_9 -0.0606 -0.0799 -0.1469* -0.1675* -0.1476 -0.1464 -0.1868 -0.1742 
Exchange 0.0027 0.0072 -0.0018 -0.007 -0.0057 -0.0049 0.0065 0.0044 
MktPerform 0.0112 0.1582 0.1498 0.239 0.3263 0.5796* 0.3681 0.4227 
Industry Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Year Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled Controlled 
Constant 0.0689 0.0345 0.1164 0.0711 0.09 0.3283* 0.3079 0.22 
Adj-R2 0.01 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.019 0.045 0.033 0.036 
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